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DCI JOINT BRIEFING FOR
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE OF THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICE COMMITTEE AND THE
SENATE AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES COMMITTEE

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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
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AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: REVIEWER:
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NSA review completed

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Topics to be covered:

1. Review of general Soviet posture.
2. Summary of Soviet missile program.
3. Soviet space program.
4. Remarks about sensitive areas in the world today.

USAF review(s) completed.

B. My remarks will be primarily based on NIE's which represent views of the entire US Intelligence Community.

II. THE GENERAL SOVIET POSTURE

A. The Soviet leaders currently show great confidence and boast that trends of events is in their favor.

1. Their rate of economic progress, their scientific achievements, their growing missile capabilities, and their estimate of the political tendencies in underdeveloped countries all taken by them as suggesting favorable shift in world power relations.

NAVY review completed.

2. From the position of strength which they believe they now have, they feel able, not only to engage the West vigorously on disputed issues when they wish to do so, but also to relax tensions when expedient without any imputation of weakness.

DOE review completed.

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B. In Soviet external policy, over the next five years, we expect to see elements of pressure and detente combined and varied as tactical advantage may suggest.

1. Whatever changes of emphasis may occur, the swings of policy are likely to fall within a range which excludes:

a. On the one hand, deliberate assumption of serious and uncontrollable risks of general war; or

b. On the other, any abandonment of the concept of continuing struggle between two irreconcilable worlds.

2. Soviet leaders may seek to draw political advantage from any improved power position relative to the West if it emerges as they expect.

a. They will STILL try to win concessions basically through negotiation.

b. But the element of pressure and threat will probably become more pronounced.

c. The chances of miscalculation may be increased.

C. General tone of Khrushchev's speech to Supreme Soviet 14 January reflects his confidence in growing Soviet strength.

D. We are inclined to accept Khrushchev's statements on manpower strength and military hardware production.

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1. Although his figure of 3.6 million men in the armed forces about 600,000 lower than our estimate, there has been downward trend in available military manpower for some years, and 3.6 million figure quite reasonable.
2. We have observed sharp cutbacks in bomber, fighter, naval vessel production.
3. We also believe that reduction of 1.2 million men will probably be carried out within the two years Khrushchev gave as an outside limit. (Defense Minister Malinovsky says by "autumn 1961.")
4. Reduction makes good sense both economically and militarily, and has propaganda advantages.

B. Soviet military establishment in for thorough reorganization.

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1. [redacted] Khrushchev has often shown impatience with military advice he is getting.
2. Although there has been considerable readjustment of Soviet forces in the last few years, he has apparently decided pace not fast enough.
3. Malinovsky, speaking immediately after Khrushchev, described the new program as follows:

"Rocket troops...are undoubtedly the main type of armed forces, however...it is not possible to solve all tasks of war with one type of troops... we are retaining at a definite strength and in relevant proportions all types of our armed forces."

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F. Khrushchev's apparent goal for force structure is as follows:

1. Strategic attack and air defense forces armed mainly with missiles.

2. A navy composed primarily of submarines as well as antisubmarine forces.

3. A ground force, equipped with tactical missiles, with increased firepower and airborne capabilities.

III. LONG RANGE BOMBER FORCES

A. Jet medium and heavy bomber strength of Soviet Long Range Aviation remained virtually constant over past year.

1. Long Range Aviation now has about 1,100 BADGER jet medium bombers (B-47) and about 120 BISON jet (B-52) and BEAR turboprop heavy bombers.

a. BEAR production ceased some time ago, BADGER production ceased in about mid-1959, BISON production continues at a low rate (one to two a month in fall of 1959).

b. Obsolescent BULL piston medium bombers (B-29) type retired rapidly in the past year--probably now completely phased out of Long Range Aviation units.

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B. Long Range Aviation remains best suited to operations against targets closer than the U.S.--for example, in Europe.

1. Majority of bombers are BADGERs capable of reaching most U.S. targets only on one-way missions.

2. From Arctic bases, refueled BISON's could reach U.S. targets on two-way missions--BEAR's could do so without refueling.

C. Total Soviet bomber strength will probably remain relatively constant for next year or two, and decline thereafter. (Backup sheet on possible new bombers)

IV. NAVAL FORCES

A. Present submarine strength is estimated at about 420--more than half are snorkel-equipped long-range post-war design. This is a reduction from about 450 carried last year, as obsolete boats are retired.

1. Estimate about 300 subs constructed since 1950.

2. Current construction slow--approximately 14 in 1959--probably due change-over to new types.

B. Believe they now have a few nuclear subs--but have not identified.

1. Nuclear-powered icebreaker LENIN has completed trials; expected enter full service 1960.

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2. Reactor used in LENIN basically adaptable to submarines.

C. A few conventially-powered Soviet submarines now evaluated as probably capable of launching ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, though not from a submerged position.

1. One type of modified long-range submarine can probably carry two missiles of 200 n.m. or possibly 350 n.m. range.

2. A newly-constructed class which was first identified in 1959 may carry about five missiles of 350 n.m. range.

3. Based on requirements and technical capabilities, estimate that in 1961-1963 USSR will first achieve a weapon system combining a nuclear powered submarine with a 500- 1,000 n.m. ballistic missile, capable of launching from submerged position.

4. USSR's missile submarines could launch nuclear warheads against selected targets in the U.S. Present strength, estimated at about 10 conventionally-powered missile subs, will probably double by 1961-1962.

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V. SOVIET GROUND FORCES

A. Soviet Ground Forces, in Khrushchev's eyes, will be smaller, but with greater firepower and much increased airborne capability.

B. Personnel strength and deployment unchanged in past year.

VI. MISSILE WEAPON SYSTEMS AND TEST PROGRAMS 25X2 USAF

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1. Production of missiles could be accomplished in available plant facilities--bulk of effort would be in constructing launching facilities, activating and training ICBM units, and providing logistic support.
2. Even to have 140 ICBM's on launcher in mid-1961 would require a vigorous program--to have 200 at that time would introduce considerable strain on their industry.

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1. After about that time, assuming that our own missile buildup proceeds on schedule, particularly the planned increase in semi-hardened and hardened US ICBM sites, would result in very steep increase in Soviet ICBM requirements to knock them out.
2. Plus our bombers on alert or undestroyed;
3. Plus carriers and missile-launching submarines at sea;
4. Plus any other bases they failed to neutralize particularly our overseas bases.

E. Present indications are that Soviet ICBM program is not a "crash" program. But we believe it is designed to provide a substantial ICBM capability at an early date. (Backup sheet referring to "crash" program)

1. Goal is probably a force as large as they think necessary for substantial deterrent and pre-emptive attack capability of considerable proportions. That is, capability to seize the initiative from an enemy believed to be preparing to attack.
2. This would be consistent with present deliberate and orderly tempo of Soviet ICBM test firings. And with Soviet policy of maintaining balance among various types of military forces during a transition to increased reliance on missiles, and pre-occupation with achieving 7-Year Plan goals.

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VIII. COMPARISON WITH LAST YEAR'S ESTIMATE

A. In comparing the ICBM estimate I have given you today with the estimate we presented last year, it is necessary to point out that last year we addressed ourselves primarily to the question is what year the Soviet Union could be expected to accumulate arbitrarily-selected number of 500 ICBMs in inventory, whereas this year we have directed our primary attention to the number of weapons the Soviets could be expected to have on launcher on selected dates. Therefore not fully comparable.

CHART (last year-this year) B. Brief from chart--cover the following points:

1. IOC date change and change to series-produced missiles.

2. On-launcher capability more significant than inventory.

Production - total missiles series produced

Operational Inventory (assigned to operational units)--production less missiles used for test, training, pipeline, maintenance

On-launcher - missiles at fully completed launching facilities, with trained crews, and in commission.

3. Comparison shows mid-points of last year's probable estimate of capability to have 500 in inventory three years after IOC date, 100 in half that time. Interpolated to derive mid-year's comparable to current estimate. (Note: Also estimated that "with overriding priority and exceptional success, this capability might be achieved in as little as two years after IOC.")

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4. Now consider that available evidence does not support estimate of "crash" program, but still estimate a vigorous one (Backup sheet available)

5. Current estimate of inventory for mid-1961 bracket: last year's, whereas current figure on launcher is considerably higher. Last year assumed 50 percent on launcher, this year take into account Soviet option to maximize salvo capability.

6. Current estimate of inventory for mid-1962 somewhat below figure given last year but critical figure on launcher ranges upward from last year's mid-point.

C. Characteristics

1. Probable payload increased

2. In-flight reliability increased

3. Additional reliability factor (on-launcher) taken into account.

4. Accuracy increased.

D. Over-all summary--current estimate forecasts for Soviets substantially the same quantity of ICBMs as last year, but forecasts ICBM of considerably higher quality.

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

K. AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES

A. Since 1956-57, Soviets have had subsonic antiship missile with maximum range about 50 nautical miles, carrying HE or nuclear warhead.

B. As U.S. defense capability increased, we believe Soviets developed improved air-to-surface system.

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c. Intelligence community estimates that in about 1961, a supersonic missile of this type and range about 350 nautical miles will be in use.

XI. AIR DEFENSE MISSILES

a. In the surface-to-air missile category, two large rings comprising 56 fixed installations surrounding Moscow remain unique. Nowhere has a second such operational installation been identified.

PHOTOS 1. Soviets are also deploying second-generation surface-to-air system capable of more effective delivery of high explosive or nuclear warhead against present Western bombers. The effectiveness of this system against very low altitude attacks cannot validly be determined.

2. This system has been identified in East Germany and and in defensive positions around many Soviet industrial and population centers. In contrast to massive, immobile system around Moscow, new system is flexible and can at less cost, be deployed widely for defense of large areas, smaller fixed points, and forces in the field.

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XII. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS

A. Space Activities

Since my last appearance before you two events have occurred which deserve special comment, namely LUNIK II and III.

1. LUNIK II

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a) Launched on 12 September 1959

b) [redacted]

c) Khrushchev arrived in the U.S. on 15 September 1959, a matter of only a few hours after impact on moon was announced.

d) The intended point of impact was not announced. Therefore, a meaningful statement of guidance accuracy cannot be made.

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e) Although LUNIK II was spectacular, did not represent as major technological advancement as LUNIK III.

2. LUNIK III

a) Launched 4 October 1959, on the 2nd anniversary date of SPUTNIK I.

b) Only several hours after launch, purpose was announced as being to photograph the moon.

c) The intended trajectory is not known. However, the announced mission, which was photography, was accomplished. 25X1

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d) Signal ceased after 7 November 1959. This was announced by the Soviets. Soviets speculate LUNIK III struck by a meteorite, but we consider it equally possible that a normal equipment failure may have occurred.

e) Western scientists could not reproduce photographs from transmitted data. This caused by Soviet failure to announce in advance frequency for transmitting photographic data. 25X1

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only. Nevertheless, we accept Soviet photographs 25X1
as genuine.

f) [redacted]

g) We consider LUNIK III a very great technological achievement. Clearly attests to very high Soviet capability in designing and developing sophisticated stabilization, photographic and data transmission systems. Very complex operation to place vehicle on proper trajectory stabilize in proper direction and automatically record and transmit data to ground station.

C. Vehicle Design

1. Analysis of photographs of Soviet missiles and evaluation of LUNIK last stage indicates that Soviet structural design is heavier and more rugged than U.S.
2. If, as seems likely, the Soviets developed their tactic ICBM and space vehicle engine from 100 metric ton unit, first tested in 1955, it might now have higher thrust and increased payload capability.
3. We estimate that within a few years they may achieve thrust ratings of 2 million pounds or more using conventional fuels.
4. With such engines, feasible to place into low earth orbits, total weights on order of 25,000 pounds, or higher.

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D. Recovery Attempts

1. USSR may have attempted two recoveries of nose cones or capsules from two long ranges rocket flights in October 1959. No information available as to success of these attempts.

2. There is no evidence that USSR has attempted to recover payloads from orbiting vehicles as had U.S.

E. Man in Space

1. There have been several recent reports that Soviets have already attempted to recover a man from space. No evidence to lend credence to these reports, however.

2. Sedov, Chairman of the Soviet Interagency Commission of for interplanetary Communications (ICIC), on recent visit to Washington stated that "the problems of astronaut recovery have not yet been solved."

3. In summary, little is known of USSR plans for early man-in-space operations except expressed determination to recover man from orbit at an early date as initial step toward proclaimed ultimate aim of manned exploration of space.

F. Objectives and Scope

1. Overall objectives of Soviet space program are judged to be the following: to conduct scientific research, to attain manned space travel, and to support Soviet propaganda and policy.

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2. No direct evidence that Soviets are developing space systems for military use, whether as weapon carrier or support system in such areas as reconnaissance, communications or early warning.

3. Capable of developing such military support systems if and when requirements arise. However, existence of Iron Curtain reduces Soviet requirement for reconnaissance satellite as compared to U.S. Large contiguous geographic area of USSR reduces need for communication satellite.

4. Soviet exploration of space to date has comprised six major events; three satellites and three lunar probes.

C. Future Soviet Space Program

1. We have no firm evidence on Soviet future plans for exploration of outer space with either unmanned or manned vehicles.

2. We believe they will continue to expand their scientific research in space with further unmanned earth satellites, lunar probes (including satellites and soft landings), and solar and planetary probes.

3. Early this month, (Jan 60) Singearaver, a member of the Interagency Commission on Interplanetary Communication, stated that the Soviets will launch a series of smaller unmanned satellites for scientific research.

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4. Since manned exploration of planets is an expressed Soviet objective, manned experiments will probably be conducted in earth satellites, circumlunar flights and soft landings on moon.

5. We expect that all manned flights into outer space will be preceded by tests with animals, unless for political purposes Soviets attempt high risk program.

6. No attempt made to estimate manned space missions beyond earth-moon realm. Time periods in which major sub-systems, such as propulsion, guidance, and capsule for prolonged manned flight can be developed into a complete space flight system cannot be foreseen.

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